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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: 
TRAPPED IN INTEGRATION?
Leon PODKAMINER
The Central and Eastern European new Member States of the European Union (CEECs) went 
through the transition process following the commandments of the Washington Consensus, which 
gradually evolved into the “integrative growth model”. External liberalisation exposed the CEECs 
to recurring problems over external imbalances, bubbles driven by capital infl ows, and resulting 
growth instabilities. Large foreign direct investment infl ows attracted by repressed wages and low 
taxes do not accelerate growth. Arguably, real convergence would be much faster under a system 
with built-in limitations to free trade, free capital movements – and with more scope for traditional 
industrial, trade, incomes, and fi scal policies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The 11 Central and Eastern European new Member States of the European Union 
(CEECs) went through the transition process following the commandments of 
the Washington Consensus. Despite more detailed (and largely less important or 
relevant) cross-country differences (institutional or structural), the policies fol-
lowed all along constitute the “integrative growth model”. External liberalisation, 
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which is the most essential pillar of that model, exposed the CEECs to recurring 
problems over external imbalances, bubbles driven by capital inflows, and re-
sulting growth instabilities. In addition, CEECs suffer from persistent Keynesian 
unemployment, but are reluctant to conduct active fiscal policies.
The hopes invested in the integrative model of CEEC growth seem to have 
been disappointed. After some acceleration, growth collapsed in 2009 and slowed 
down to unimpressive levels thereafter. Under growing integration into the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), CEEC growth rates may be converging to the low rates pre-
vailing in the “old” EU. But such a convergence does not promise a catch-up in 
income-level terms. Worse still, the CEECs do not prove resilient to the crisis 
shaking the “old” EU (and the euro area in particular). Last but not least, it can-
not be overlooked that in most cases  high unemployment has become endemic, 
while high and growing internal income (and social) polarisation feeds political 
radicalism, likely to explode sooner or later. 
Section 2 reflects on the fact that the backwardness of CEESs has deep roots. 
Renewed attempts to catch up with the West – based on the emulation of practices 
and policies which developed “organically” elsewhere – failed in the past. Sec-
tion 3 asks whether integration into the European Union must necessarily result 
in the CEECs eventually overcoming their secular backwardness. Section 4 char-
acterises the “integrative growth model” which has been embraced by the CEECs 
following transition and EU accession. Section 5 offers some critical judgement 
on the advantages of excessive reliance on foreign direct investment (FDI). Sec-
tion 6 discusses the tendency to suppress wage costs, which prevails under the 
integrative growth model. Section 7 links the tendency to suppress wages to the 
economic policies followed in Germany. Section 8 argues that a switchover to the 
euro carries huge risks to the CEECs. Finally, Section 9 concludes, pessimisti-
cally, on the catch-up prospects of CEECs.
2. PROLOGUE: BACKWARDNESS OF CENTRAL 
AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAS DEEP ROOTS
The relative backwardness of the Central and Eastern European countries seems 
to have deep historical roots. According to Maddison (2001), the average GDP 
per capita of Central and Eastern Europe (excluding Russia) stood at 48% of 
the Core Western European level by 1820 (down from 54% in 1500). (The Core 
encompass 12 Western European countries, including Italy but excluding Spain 
and Portugal.) Further decline continued thereafter. By 1870, the CEEC per 
capita GDP fell to less than 42% of the Western European level, followed by 
41% in 1913. Clearly, the century-long deepening of the relative backwardness 
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of CEECs (1820–1913) could not be ascribed to the adoption of a “socialistic” 
economic system. In fact, during that period, some laissez-faire practices – fur-
thest removed from any socialistic innovations – had been copied in CEECs (and 
coexisted with various remnants of the feudal economic and social order). Other 
factors must have determined the yawning gap between the Western European 
Core and the CEEC periphery.1 
What is the character of those “other factors” that may have been instrumental 
in pushing the CEECs into relative decline over 1820–1913? Could these fac-
tors have been responsible (at least partly) also for the renewed decline of the 
CEECs after 1973? Has the post-1990 transition – and then the EU accession 
– finally deactivated those forces, or could they still be reactivated? An attempt 
at answering these questions needs to start with the observation that geography, 
in collaboration with history, condemned the CEEC region to the role of po-
litical, social, and economic hinterland of Core Western Europe. Over centuries, 
the latter region went through various parallel, long-term processes culminating 
in the emergence of mature democratic/constitutional systems and the develop-
ment of urban economies based on pre-capitalist (and then capitalist) modes of 
production and exchange – with markets playing a central, though clearly not 
an exclusive, role. Social structures in Core Western Europe have evolved ac-
cordingly, giving rise not only to a native capitalist (or entrepreneurial) class, but 
also to various specialised professional strata (including guilds of men of letters, 
sciences, and technical invention). Interactions between the social, political, and 
economic structures produced a stream of innovations – not only in narrowly 
defined technology of production of goods and services, but also as far as the 
broadly understood organisation (legal, political) of societies is concerned. On 
all of these counts, the CEEC region remained stagnant, lagging behind Core 
Western Europe. Moreover, in some areas, the CEECs occasionally suffered re-
tardation (for instance, the re-establishment of serfdom, return to specialisation 
in production and exports of goods of agricultural or forestry origin, which was 
combined with a dwindling of urban crafts and trades, or the disenfranchisement 
of commoners). Importantly, the nascent urban (pre-capitalist and then capitalist) 
1  In the post WWII period, the relative decline of the CEECs was halted – by 1950, their per capita 
GDP edged up slightly to 42% of the Western European level. By 1973, the per capita GDP of 
the CEECs is estimated to have been close to 41% of the Western European level – back to its 
1913 level. The condemnation of the “central planning system” as the source of CEEC back-
wardness is thus not quite warranted. “Central planning” did not downgrade the CEECs vs. the 
West. Of course, it remains true that in the late 1970s, the CEECs suddenly lost out to the West. 
Having slid into decline during the 1980s, the CEECs ended miserably by the end of that decade. 
But the true catastrophe followed thereafter, when the command-economy system was scrapped 
and the transition started.
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strata in the CEECs represented minority ethnic groups commonly seen as aliens 
(be they Jews or Germans) rather than “natives”. This tended to sever (or even 
poison) the relationship between the emerging national CEE states and the emerg-
ing (post-feudal) economic orders. 
The technological-industrial and political-social revolutions of the late 18th and 
the early 19th centuries accelerated overall progress – and also economic growth in 
Core Western Europe – to an unprecedented degree (see, for example, Hobsbawm 
1962). The gap between the Core and the CEEC region started to widen faster 
than before. The region’s elites responded to the growing gaps by repeatedly at-
tempting to emulate some features, deemed essential, of the systems prevailing in 
the Core (Berend 2003). During the late 19th century, the laissez-faire and export-
led industrialisation was considered vital to the success of the Core; after World 
War I, it was the import-substitution policy combined with nationalistically mo-
tivated protectionism and a measure of governmental interventionism. Berend 
– Ránki (1974, 1982) argued that even the adoption of the Soviet-style “central 
planning” may be interpreted as yet another – futile – attempt at overcoming the 
CEECs’ backwardness vs. Western Europe. For some time that attempt seemed 
(moderately) successful.2 However, unlike the Core, the Soviet Union (and its 
CEEC satellites) proved unable to adjust to the challenges emerging upon the 
outbreak of a new wave of technological (and economic liberalisation) revolution 
in the West whose beginning is dated, approximately, at 1973. 
3. CAN THE BACKWARDNESS OF CEECS BE OVERCOME?
Generally, the attempts at a mechanical emulation of practices that had endog-
enously (“organically”) evolved elsewhere were unsuccessful, for many rea-
sons. Germany/Russia may be considered exceptions (Germany sure, Russia 
may be a more problematic case): this erstwhile backward CEEC area eventu-
ally managed to catch up with Core Western Europe on many counts, though 
the process had not been quite complete until the 1950s. A detailed discussion 
of these reasons would take us too far astray. Certainly, a measure of good luck 
may also be a necessary ingredient of the successful emulation of an alien sys-
tem, as well as the presence of dedicated, determined, and competent national 
state bureaucracies. 
2  Giving rise to the appeal of the erstwhile fashionable hypothesis on the convergence of the two 
systems: Socialism and Capitalism. (The hypothesis was advanced, e.g., by Tinbergen and Gal-
braith in the 1960s.)
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In their transition “from plan to the market”, the CEECs definitely attempted to 
emulate many features – actual or apparent – characterising contemporary devel-
oped industrial countries. Although on some counts the resulting socio-economic 
systems that have evolved in the CEEC region are quite poor caricatures of some 
of the Western European systems (as far as the levels of inequality, social protec-
tion, provision of public services, or labour relations are concerned), the CEECs, 
being admitted into the EU, have received the official seal of approval. Formally, 
they have entered the club of prosperous countries, apparently sharing the latter’s 
goals and values. The expectation is that in due time they will also share in the 
Core’s affluence.
The time that has elapsed since the CEECs overcame their first-stage “transitional 
recessions” (around 1995 in most cases) is still quite short. Out of necessity, the con-
clusions on the patterns of real convergence must be viewed as provisional. Generally, 
there seems to have been some convergence (in per capita real income terms). How-
ever, the findings regarding factors determining the characteristics of convergence are 
generally inconclusive. Moreover, the very convergence itself can be disputed.3 While 
until 2008, the position, in terms of per capita GDP, of the lower-income CEECs had 
improved markedly (in accordance with the beta-convergence hypothesis of the neo-
classical growth theory), the position of the higher-income CEECs (Slovenia, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic) has remained roughly constant over longer periods of time. 
Worse still, the very fast GDP growth in the initially poor Baltic countries (which for 
a while seemed to be converging quickly to the Core) turned into deep and protracted 
recessions in 2007–2009.4 More recently, growth in the remaining CEECs has again 
become stagnant, or turned into recessions. 
Of course, the popular understanding (implicit in most instances) is that the 
CEECs will eventually converge, in terms of affluence, to the Western European 
Core. But is the convergence really assured? Or, could it be expected to happen 
in a historically relevant time span? Finally, how certain could one be that the 
post-transition convergence would not come to an end sooner or later (or has 
3  Until recently, the econometric research on CEEC convergence (and its underlying factors) 
produced conclusions consistent with the official optimism expressed by the EU officials (see, 
e.g., Böwer – Turrini 2010). Much more pessimistic conclusions follow from econometric 
research taking into account the post-2007 experiences (see, e.g., Darvas 2010).
4  The deep recessions in the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, and Romania generated large waves of 
outmigration. For example, Latvia’s population fell by about 10%, from 2,276 thousand in 2007 
to 2,047 thousand in 2012. The depopulation recorded lowers the size of losses in terms of per 
capita income. Even though the real GDP of Latvia fell cumulatively 14% (2012 over 2007), in 
per capita terms the GDP decline was “only” about 4% over the same period. Bulgaria’s popu-
lation fell by 4.3%, Estonia’s by 4%, Lithuania’s by 10.5%, and Romania’s by 11.8%, respec-
tively.
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not already come to an end) – keeping the CEECs permanently outside the Core, 
at their historically attested relative positions? Of course, no one knows the fu-
ture. But there are some empirical grounds for doubts concerning the longer-term 
prospects of convergence. 
First, despite truly massive efforts maintained over many decades, conver-
gence is not guaranteed on the sub-national level – even in the Core EU countries. 
Massive aid to former East Germany has not really advanced its true economic 
integration with the former Federal Republic (while being associated with a mas-
sive depopulation of the East). Convergence of the former GDR came to a halt 
around 1995. In the second half of the 1990s, GDP of the former GDR grew 
at 1.5% p.a.: a lower rate than in the former Federal Republic. In 1995, labour 
productivity in the former German Democratic Republic was 36% lower than 
in the former Federal Republic; after 2000, the labour (and capital) productivity 
gaps had stabilised at about 30% (Ragnitz 2007). In 2012, the average wage in 
the former GDR (including the whole of Berlin, with its highly paid jobs in the 
federal government) was still over 20% lower than in the old Federal Republic 
and the rate of unemployment almost twice as high (11.2% vs. 6.1%). Similarly, 
despite quite massive financial transfers sustained for over fifty or more years 
now, Italy’s Mezzogiorno has been drifting away, in per capita terms, from north-
ern Italy (and that despite continuing migration from the south to the north). In 
1952, the per capita GDP of southern Italy amounted to 64% of the per capita 
GDP for the rest of the country; in 1999, that ratio stood at 54% (Boltho 2001). 
More recent Eurostat regional statistics indicate that southern Italy has continued 
to lose out to the north. In 2011, Campania’s per capita GDP fell to 47% of Lom-
bardy’s level. 
Secondly, the success of the so-called EU cohesion countries (Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, and Portugal) is not proving sustainable, as evidenced by the post-2008 
developments. In income terms, these countries have now been losing out to the 
Core, possibly heading back towards the relative positions attained long ago.5 
A consideration of the patterns of CEEC development since their transition 
(and especially since their accession to the EU) can be hoped to deliver some 
insights about what their future developments may look like. For that reason, re-
5  The convergence of Greece, Spain and Portugal slowed down after their EU accessions: “Greece 
experienced much slower growth after joining the EU in 1981 than in the decades before [...] 
Spain’s growth rate was not much affected by EU membership. Most of its catching-up with 
the EU core was achieved before accession [...] Portugal’s income had converged with the EU 
until 1974 when its growth was interrupted by the democratic revolution at home and the world 
economic crisis abroad” (Dauderstaedt 2001; see also Laski – Römisch 2003). It is worth noting 
that Ireland’s growth acceleration only took place in the 1990s. Ireland’s accession to the EU did 
not bring about any acceleration during the first 15 years of membership (1973–1989).
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flecting on their past experiences can be a productive activity. Needless to say, the 
past experiences have been co-determined by external developments including 
the policies enacted at EU levels and beyond (“globalisation”). It must be remem-
bered that the paradigms behind the past EU economic policy-making have been 
critically questioned since the 2008–9 crisis. Possible changes in these paradigms 
would certainly have consequences also for the CEECs’ economic prospects. 
4.  DEEPENING EXTERNAL LIBERALISATION AND THE EMERGENCE 
OF THE “INTEGRATIVE GROWTH MODEL”
Nothing even remotely smacking of the elaborate and consistently enforced pro-
tectionism characteristic of the East Asian “tiger economies” has ever been tried 
in CEECs. The reasons for the absence of such protectionism (and also for the ab-
sence of other forms of traditional industrial policy) were manifold. Internally , pro-
tectionist measures (and industrial policy measures at large) were highly suspect 
on “ideological” grounds – as somewhat reminiscent of the discredited “socialist ” 
past. Moreover, a successful industrial policy seems only possible in a country 
disposing of a competent, dedicated, and reasonably incorrupt national bureauc-
racy. Transforming CEECs have not had the opportunity to develop such bureauc-
racies. Externally, the protectionist measures were not only equally inacceptable, 
on ideological grounds, to the representatives of the international financial organi-
sations on whose goodwill the CEECs then critically depended (for instance as far 
as access to “hard-currency” credits, or foreign debt write-offs, were concerned). 
The then ruling Washington Consensus essentially outlawed active protectionist/
industrial policies, especially stigmatising import-substitution policies. Also, the 
governments which aspired to membership in international economic organisa-
tions such as the OECD or GATT/WTO felt obliged to demonstrate zeal while 
taking over and implementing the statutes of these organisations to the full. In this 
respect, the CEECs differed from the East Asian “tiger economies” (and China) 
which tend to obey the statutes of international economic organisations rather 
selectively. Even before EU accessions, the effective taxes (excluding VAT) and 
customs duties charged on imports were reduced radically in most CEECs. Fur-
ther reductions followed thereafter. Tariff rates in intra-EU trade are zero. 
Running the traditional national trade/industrial policies was (as it still is) also 
incompatible with the basic ideas underlying the European economic integration. 
The integration with (or rather into) the European Union could proceed only on the 
Union’s terms. In practical terms, CEECs had to adjust very many of their policies 
and economic institutions to the Union’s requirements. The most essential of these 
requirements were (and still are) fully consistent in spirit, if not in letter, with the 
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original Washington Consensus. The EU basic freedoms (and many more acquis 
communautaire items, especially the ones regulating “free and fair” competition 
within the Union) have determined the model of CEEC development. That model 
may be termed “integrative”. It should be reiterated that some elements of the 
“integrative model of CEEC development” were put into practice well ahead of 
the EU accession. The spirit of that model has permeated the transition policies all 
along – as integration with the West was the major goal of transition. 
Essentially, the model assumes, more or less explicitly, that a CEEC can (and 
obviously will) grow fast – and eventually catch up with the “old” EU – without 
any traditional active trade or industrial policy, provided several (assumed to be 
complementary) policies are consistently followed:
1.  The policy should strive to attract as large amounts of foreign capital (be it 
private investment, or transfers “donated” by EU institutions) as possible. 
“Friendliness” towards foreign capital is therefore deemed essential. Foreign 
capital inflows are believed to be necessary for the acceleration of domestic 
capital formation (helping to overcome the “shortage of national savings”). 
Moreover, such inflows are expected to be central to the narrowing of the tech-
nology/organisational gaps vis-à-vis the highly developed countries. It must 
have been also hoped that inflows would naturally help advance the private-
owned indigenous business sector (through enhanced cooperation/integration 
with the foreign-owned forms and the dissemination of foreign technological 
and managerial know-how).
2.  “Structural reforms” are to be consistently advanced. Apart from the further 
advancement of privatisation (including public utilities and public sectors pro-
viding education, health, and social security), these reforms should be aim-
ing at (a) flexibilisation of the labour market (the removal of “distortions” 
restricting the employers’ freedom to hire and fire personnel, liberalisation of 
the Labour Code regulations); (b) reduction of the scope of publicly financed 
services (health, education) and transfer payments (unemployment benefits 
and old-age pensions). The contraction of the welfare-state institutions and 
the winding-up of the rights of the workers aims to infuse the individual rep-
resentatives of the labour force with the strong desire to rely on own devices 
and to perform competitively. 
3.  Fiscal policies are to be “sound”, meaning that they should not only seek to 
eliminate public sector deficits, but also try to reduce spending (and taxation) 
as much as possible. As far as taxation goes, they should additionally seek to 
lower the burden of taxation falling on capital and on high personal incomes. 
The latter postulate has given rise to successive rounds of cuts in tax rates 
levied on firms’ income and the popularity (at least among the ruling elites) of 
“flat” systems of personal income taxation. 
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It can be observed that the flat tax systems, stipulating huge gains to the recipi-
ents of high incomes, were introduced (de jure or de facto) in most CEECs. Thus 
understood, the “sound” fiscal policy has been considered central to rapid private 
capital formation – and the rise of indigenous entrepreneurial classes. 
In fact, the personal income taxation windfalls accruing to wealthy domestic 
individuals seem to have fed large imports of luxury goods and services as well as 
enabled the erection of lavish residences. There is no evidence of these windfalls 
supporting productive domestic investment. Moreover, the foreign firms rather 
than the domestic ones were the primary beneficiaries of falling taxation of busi-
ness income. It is quite clear that the falling corporate tax rates were to encourage 
FDI inflows. Indeed, CEECs have entered a regular race to the bottom as far as 
taxation of capital is concerned (Table 1). Undoubtedly, no individual CEEC is 
likely to win that race: collectively, all CEECs stand to lose.
Table 1. Statutory corporate income tax rates (%)
1995 2000 2005 2014 ECTR2010
USA 39.6 39.3 39.3 39.1 34.6
Germany 55.1 52,0 38.9 30.2 23.8
Ireland 38.0 24.0 12.5 12.5 10.9
Korea 30.8 27.5 24.2 29.5
Bulgaria 4.6
Croatia 9.5
Czech Republic 41.0 26.0 26.0 19.0 12.0
Estonia 24.0 24.0 21.0
Latvia 5.6
Lithuania
Hungary 18.0 18.0 16.0 19.0 15.9
Poland 40.0 30.0 28.0 19.0 14.3
Romania 8.6
Slovenia 25.0 25.0 17.0 11.6
Slovakia 40.0 29.0 19.0 22.0 11.2
Note: ECTR is “effective corporate income tax rate on new investment”.
Sources: Statutory corporate income rates: OECD (2014); ECTR: Cato Institute (2012).
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5. CEECS HAVE INDEED BEEN DEEPLY “PENETRATED” BY FDI
Attracting FDI was pioneered in Hungary already in 1989. Large inflows to the 
Czech Republic started a bit later (in 1992). Other CEECs followed suit, though 
on the whole they were less successful, at least initially. To some extent, the ini-
tial progress was tied up to the modes (and speeds) of privatisations. That the pri-
vatisations (and thus privatisation-related FDI) must have involved a good deal 
of corruption (with public assets landing in foreign – or sometimes native – hands 
after being disposed of at fractions of their actual worth) seems rather obvious.6 
With privatisations more or less complete (in the early 2000s), the bulk of 
FDI since has increasingly represented “greenfield” investments. The policies 
towards FDI have continued to be singularly “friendly” (less so only in Slovenia). 
Foreign investors have been enjoying various (open or kept confidential) privi-
leges (among others tax holidays, subsidised infrastructural services, other “in-
centives”). Quite often, these privileges were not shared by the domestic-owned 
(even if genuinely private) businesses. The extraordinary “friendliness” towards 
foreign direct investors is well documented for instance by OECD sources.7 In 
contrast to China and most other South-East Asian “tigers”, CEECs do not seem 
to have been selective in admitting FDI inflows. One has not heard much about 
branches that were deliberately kept out of the reach of foreigners. In emerging 
Asia (but also in the rich West and in Japan), the financial sectors (including the 
banking and insurance business) tend to be firmly nationally owned. Some serv-
ice sectors (such as retail trade) are also protected from foreign takeovers (for 
example in Japan) as providers of employment to the low-skill or handicapped 
representatives of the domestic labour force (for instance elder people). But in the 
CEECs, the vital sectors (including finances and retailing) are now more or less 
under full foreign control. Authorities very rarely meddle with FDI inflows. When 
they do, interventions reflect purely political aversions – for instance against Rus-
sian capital. (The attempts of some Russian firms to set foot in CEECs are often 
blocked because of their nationality, and also because of the supposed control 
of these firms by the Russian government. Other states’, for example France’s, 
government ownership of energy, banking, or telecom firms was not an obstacle 
to these firms taking over strategically important CEEC domestic firms.)
6  Unsurprisingly, research on this aspect of privatisation is rather scant (Poznanski 1997, 2011 and 
Dunn 2004 are rather exceptional). Sometimes the sellouts, at large discounts, of highly valuable 
assets to foreign parties were intended, as a part of the policy of “aggressive attraction” of FDI.
7  See OECD at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2011-en/04/02/01/index.html?itemId 
=/content/chapter/factbook-2011-38-en
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All in all, the CEECs have “received” large amounts of FDI. By 2013, the FDI 
(stock)/GDP ratio exceeded 84% in Estonia, followed by Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, and Slovakia (with ratios of 82%, 66%, and 59%, respectively). In 
Poland, the ratio stood at 46%, in Romania and in Slovenia at 31%. (In Bulgaria, 
the FDI (stock)/GDP ratio exceeded 100% in 2010.)
The FDI (stock)/GDP ratios for CEECs are generally much higher than for 
the larger OECD countries: the average FDI/GDP ratio for the entire OECD is 
29%. However, in contrast to the CEECs, the developed countries export more 
FDI than they receive. (This applies also to Luxembourg and Switzerland.) For 
the whole OECD, the outward FDI (stock)/GDP ratio exceeds the inward FDI 
(stock)/GDP ratio by 10 percentage points. For Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic, the inward FDI (stock)/GDP ratio exceeds the correspond-
ing outward ratio by huge margins, in excess of 50 percentage points. For Poland 
and Slovenia, the respective indicators are 35 and 15 percentage points. Thus, as 
far as FDI is concerned, there is a sharp contrast between the highly developed 
countries and the CEECs. While the exchange of FDI among the rich countries 
is roughly balanced, suggesting the possibility of a mutually beneficial “trade in 
capital”, CEECs exhibit a rather abnormal dependence on FDI coming from rich 
countries. Even in Poland, whose penetration by FDI is still relatively shallow, 
the foreign-capital firms account, as of end-2012, for 30% of employment (in 
larger firms submitting balance sheets to the tax authorities). At the same time, 
they account for 40% of revenues and 68% of export revenues (GUS 2013).8 No 
doubt the domination of foreign capital must be even much stronger in the other 
CEECs (again, except in Slovenia). Is this domination necessarily bad? It is per-
haps too early to answer this question definitively. However, one may consider a 
couple of relevant facts:
1.  Throughout the 1990s, Poland was considered a laggard in both mass-scale 
privatisation and FDI inflows. Ironically, Poland was the first to overcome the 
transitional recession and enter a relatively fast growth path (that lasted until 
2000). Hungary and the Czech Republic – the leaders in both privatisation and 
FDI inflows – performed rather weakly throughout the 1990s (and not much 
better later on).
2.  Growth in East Asia has been much faster and stable than in the CEECs, with-
out these countries allowing foreign capital to take over their economies. This 
is epitomised by the experience of South Korea, unquestionably the most suc-
cessful of the medium-size emerging markets. The country does not encourage 
8  FDI firms’ imports are about 9% bigger than their exports: FDI firms contribute negatively to the 
trade balance.
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inward FDI: the stock of inward FDI is equivalent to 13% of its GDP. Korean 
outward FDI is also quite small (its stock represents 14% of the 2012 GDP). 
3.  It is not quite true that “capital does not have nationality” (and thus chooses the 
place to settle down following only objective economic criteria). Large foreign 
firms active in CEECs (and elsewhere) tend to keep the most essential activities 
(such as vital R&D and managerial) in their home countries even if it could be 
cheaper to transfer such activities to the lower-cost countries. Sometimes they 
even re-locate the manufacturing activities back home (apparently to support 
domestic employment there). Currently, FIAT is winding up production and 
employment in its highly efficient Polish subsidiary, only to move production 
to its admittedly much less productive plants in Italy. In any case, one should 
consider the possibility of split national “loyalties” of foreign-owned enterpris-
es active in the CEECs. Imaginably, sometimes they may prefer actions benefit-
ing their home countries, even if this may do some harm to their hosts. Clearly, 
such situations could happen not only with regard to FDI in which foreign gov-
ernments have some stakes. Also, the private FDI in banking could feel obliged 
to follow the recommendations of their home countries’ authorities (such as 
financial supervision agencies) rather than of those of the host countries. 
4.  High inflows of capital (including FDI) may – or may not – have brought about 
acceleration of GDP growth. Convincing research showing unambiguously 
that FDI inflows cause GDP growth (or at least strengthen it) is conspicuously 
missing. However, one does not need to run regressions to conclude that high 
capital (including FDI) inflows must result in rising shares of GDP accruing to 
foreigners. This is the case not only in the CEECs, but also in other recipients 
of large capital inflows (such as Ireland). The countries most successful in at-
tracting FDI: the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary, pay rather dearly for 
their success – but still not as much as Ireland. These countries (performing 
quite well in foreign trade, at least recently) currently generate pretty large 
trade surpluses. But these surpluses are amassed by foreigners in the form of 
profits accruing to FDI enterprises (Table 2). In effect, even CEECs recording 
high trade surpluses run persistently large current account deficits. This phe-
nomenon is quite easy to explain: the bulk of FDI has gone into sectors that 
do not contribute to exports, and relatively little of it to manufacturing which 
may be capable of engaging in exports (Table 3). But the non-exporting sec-
tors earn (and repatriate) profits – probably well in excess of profits (and trade 
surpluses) worked out by the manufacturing FDI firms. 
5.  While FDI in manufacturing can, at least in theory, have all the positive ef-
fects often expected from FDI, and none of the negative ones, it is really 
difficult to identify any positive effects resulting from the foreign capital 
taking over domestic service sectors such as domestic trade, water supply, 
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financial intermediation, and real estate renting (which dominate the FDI in 
the CEECs, see Table 3). Certainly, the foreign firms active in these service 
sectors may raise their efficiency, by increasing the level of effort extracted 
from employees and by lowering the levels of their compensation (relative to 
effort), or by extracting rents from their customers and/or suppliers. Quite ob-
viously, employment and wage bills in service sectors which have been taken 
over by foreign capital tend to be “rationalised”. Under high and persistent 
Table 2. Current account and FDI income balance (% of GDP)
 Current account FDI income balance
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Bulgaria 0.1 –0.8 1.9 –4.7 –3.6 –4.2
Croatia –0.8 0 0.9 –4.4 –4.9 –3.9
Czech Rep. –2.7 –1.3 –1.4 –6.5 –6.5 –7.9
Estonia 1.8 –1.8 –1.0 –7.0 –6.9 –5.1
Hungary 0.4 0.8 3.0 –4.8 –4.6 –4.2
Latvia –2.1 –2.5 –0.8 –2.0 –3.2 –3.2
Lithuania –3.7 –0.2 1.5 –3.8 –2.4 –2.4
Poland –5.0 –3.7 –1.3 –3.6 –3.3 –2.9
Romania –4.5 –4.4 –1.1 –0.3 –1.0 –2.1
Slovakia –3.8 2.2 2.1 –6.1 –4.2 –4.1
Slovenia 0.4 3.3 6.3 –1.1 –1.6 –1.2
Source: WIIW FDI Report 2014.
Table 3. Sectoral structure of FDI stocks (%, 2012–2013)
BG CR CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI
Manufacturing 17.7 23.3 33.1 14.3 20.1 12.3 24.7 31.7 31.2 30.6 24.4
Electricity, water 
supply, etc. 7.1 1.1 6.2 3.2 4.2 3.9 5.0 3.8 9.6 16.9 2.9
Trade, car repair, 
etc. 14.3 9.1 10.7 15.7 11.5 12.7 10.2 14.2 11.4 9.8 15.6
Transport, storage, 
communication 11.1 6.9 7.6 7.6 8.0 6.9 11.2 5.4 6.3 4.9 3.1
Financial 
intermediation 16.6 33.5 21.7 24.9 7.3 25.0 24.3 24.3 18.5 22.8 41.4
Real estate, 
renting & business 
activities 
20.2 15.2 12.6 24.4 39.4 13.1 15.9 12.5 8.6 10.0 8.0
Remaining 
activities 13.0 7.9 8.1 9.9 9.5 26.1 8.7 8.1 14.4 5.0 4.6
Source: WIIW FDI Report 2014.
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unemployment this is not necessarily a positive development (at least from 
the macroeconomic viewpoint). The erstwhile employees of the service sec-
tors add to the pool of idle workers of which there is no shortage anyway. Of 
course, the employment and wage costs rationalisation increases additional 
profits (or rather rents)9 accruing to the foreign firms. Arguably, these profits 
could do some good to the whole national economy (get invested in the ex-
pansion of productive assets, also in the tradable sector). But, they can also 
end up as foreigners’ income leaving the host country, or as means of further 
service sector takeovers. 
6. THE SPECTRE OF WAGE COMPETITIVENESS
As long as the financial position of the CEECs was uncertain, the trade liberalisa-
tion exposing CEEC producers to foreign competition did not carry serious risks. 
Imports were restricted by the unavailability of sufficiently cheap trade credit. In-
itially, also deep devaluations combined with suppressed domestic demand kept 
imports in check. Thus, the restriction of imports gave the domestic producers (of 
even low-quality goods) some breathing space.
As the reputation of the CEECs and the perception of their economic prospects 
improved (also due to the dutiful obedience to the Washington Consensus com-
mandments, their membership in international economic organisations, the for-
eign debt rescheduling deals, and EU accession perspectives), foreign exchange 
tended to flood the liberalised markets. The first large wave of such inflows came 
to the more advanced countries in the mid-1990s. The forms of these inflows were 
quite diverse, ranging from unrequited transfers (official aid of various forms) to 
FDI and then portfolio investment.10 These inflows, allowing the accumulation of 
large official reserves, pulled in commercial loans, including trade credits. The 
latter became lavishly available at last, enabling large imports. To make the mat-
ter worse, the overabundance of foreign exchange strengthened the domestic cur-
 9  Very many of the CEEC service sector firms tend to be oligopolistic in character. Their activities 
allow the extraction of high rents. Foreign capital taking over, or developing, such sectors (e.g. 
commercial banking, insurance, energy, telecommunications, retail chains) actually engage in 
DUPs (Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking activities, as defined by Bhagwati 1982).
10  Throughout the 1990s and even the 2000s, inflation, though gradually declining, was still defi-
nitely higher than in the West. Interest rates were, correspondingly, much higher than elsewhere. 
Once the capital flows were liberalised, massive “carry trade” developed. The short-term (“hit-
and-run”) capital inflows into CEECs exploited the interest rate differentials – but also benefitted 
from the bursts of nominal appreciation of the currencies of the host countries. (See Podkaminer 
2006, Oblath 2006.)
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rencies – or at least prevented their orderly weakening – in line with the domestic 
inflation. The ensuing real appreciation strengthened the competitive pressures 
on domestic producers. 
The responses to these pressures were – up to a point – positive: domestic 
producers were forced to improve quality and cut costs, to seek new ways of op-
eration, and to innovate. Those of them that could not withstand the intensifying 
competition were forced out of business.
The domestic producers’ quality and efficiency reserves that could be quickly 
mobilised were, generally speaking, not very impressive, also on account of the 
inherited secular backwardness of these countries (low levels of production-ori-
ented R&D, long separation from the world technological developments, and ob-
solete management practices). Monetary policies (still seeking to reduce inflation, 
via high interest rates) were not supporting the necessary (but inherently risky) 
investment in R&D. Nor was a meaningful and well-addressed public financial 
support available to most of them. All in all, the “advantages of backwardness” 
(even assuming they existed) could not be quickly exploited. 
The easiest (and, given the unavailability of protectionist instruments, practi-
cally the only) way to stay afloat has been to suppress wages and non-wage costs 
of labour. Of course, some of the foreign-owned enterprises (as well as some do-
mestic ones), especially in technologically more advanced branches, might have 
had a higher potential to innovate and to stay competitive without forcing labour 
costs down. However, it is hard to expect from such competitive firms to offer 
wages much different from those generally prevailing on the market. Besides, 
such innovative firms are met relatively seldom. The bulk of firms seem to prefer 
squeezing down wages to engaging in genuine innovation. Overall, the tendency 
to suppress wages in most CEECs can be quite well documented (see Table 4). 
Even in the Czech Republic, where the wage share does not seem to be falling, it 
is much lower than in the euro area. Also, observe that the tendency for the wage 
share to decline has characterised Germany as well. 
It may be noticed that in Slovenia the tendency for the wage share to decline seems 
less pronounced than elsewhere. Slovenia’s rather high wage share may reflect that 
country’s particularly low level of FDI (and, consequently, much weaker profitability 
drive in the service sector). Alternatively, it may represent some persistent influence 
of the Yugoslav past (characterised by its unique system of labour management). Ro-
mania seems to represent another experience. Romania’s wage share is much lower 
than elsewhere – and does not really seem to be declining consistently. These facts 
may have something to do with the exceptionally high share of self-employment in 
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Romania.11 The tactics of combating foreign competition by means of suppressing 
wages and wage costs carries serious risks that must be acknowledged. 
Firstly, non-tradable goods and services naturally constitute the lion’s share of 
GDP, even in countries at a relatively low level of affluence. The share of serv-
ices rises with rising real income, the share of goods (tradables) declines. Real 
GDP growth is primarily associated with (or driven by) rising demand (house-
hold demand in the first place) for services.12 Suppressing household incomes 
(through wage repression) may add to GDP growth through increased exports 
and/or lowered imports. But the resulting gain may well fall short of losses due 
to the lowered demand for (and thus supply of) domestic non-tradable services. 
The unwelcome – and rather unexpected – consequences of the drive for external 
competitiveness are not an abstract eventuality. Such consequences have mate-
rialised in Germany, where the restriction of wages and domestic demand was 
11  In 2010, Romanian agriculture (dominated by small-scale peasant farming) employed 29% of 
its professionally active population, against about 20% in Bulgaria and 13% in Poland. (In the 
remaining CEECs, the shares in question range between 3% in the Czech Republic and 9% in 
Lithuania.) The natural structural change away from farming (and self-employment) into urban 
wage-paying occupations, expected to be strong under such conditions, would automatically 
inflate the total national wage bill, preventing a decline in the wage share as observed in the 
structurally more advanced CEEC.
12  For instance in 2008, even in Bulgaria the share of such “non-tradables” in GDP stood at an 
estimated 56% (and in the euro area at 68%). (See also Podkaminer 2010.)
Table 4. GDP share of labour compensation (%)
2001 2007 2013
Bulgaria 35.3 32.7 40.4
Croatia 48.0 47.4 48.2
CzechRepublic 38.6 39.5 40.6
Estonia 44.6 45.5 46.5
Latvia 40.3 43.9 41.2
Lithuania 37.9 42.4 39.2
Hungary 44.5 45.9 43.9
Poland 42.1 36.4 37.1
Romania 41.1 36.6 31.5
Slovenia 50.9 49.0 50.5
Slovakia 39.2 35.4 37.3
Average (weighted) 42.0 39.3 38.8
Germany 52.3 47.7 50.8
Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO).
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associated with an impressive foreign trade performance – and an overall secular 
GDP growth stagnation. 
Secondly, competitiveness is a relative phenomenon. Attempts at gaining cost 
(or wage) competitiveness are likely to be reciprocated by wage restrictions in 
other countries. There is a potential for a race to the bottom, which eventually 
would make all parties involved worse off. 
Last, but not least, the growth model that boils down to a drive for the minimi-
sation of costs and wages for the safeguarding of external competitiveness can-
not be an attractive long-term alternative in a liberalised global economy. In that 
economy, any CEEC can win the cost/wage competition with China only provided 
it succeeds in reducing wages (and the wage-earners’ living standards) to Chinese 
levels. Needless to say, such a “success” would imply a dramatic suppression of 
the domestic demand, tantamount to an unprecedented GDP recession. 
7. THE “GERMAN PROBLEM” SPILLS OVER INTO THE ENTIRE EU, 
INCLUDING THE CEECS
The tendency of Germany to outcompete others on nominal unit labour costs has 
not been entirely due to the free operation of market forces. 
Since at least 1995, the successive German governments have pursued policies 
promoting cuts in labour costs. Germany has gone through successive waves of 
“labour market reforms” aimed at enhancing the market’s “flexibility”. Increased 
labour market flexibility is a polite term for greater licence to revoke workers’ 
traditional rights and to “downscale” the labour codes that had safeguarded em-
ployees’ living standards.13 Transfer payments to both low-income employees and 
the unemployed were curtailed – apparently to increase the labour supply (as if 
there were a labour shortage, not high unemployment). In its capacity as the em-
ployer of a large segment of the workforce (active in the public service sectors), 
the German government has sought to economise on wages and employment lev-
els. This has had a direct influence on wage negotiations between the trade unions 
and private businesses. That the government mediated in these negotiations and 
demanded “wage moderation” (but not profit moderation) goes without saying. 
High unemployment – and the prospects of production being “outsourced” to 
low-wage countries – helped to reduce wage aspirations. All these policies con-
tributed to suppressing the growth of real (and even nominal) wages – despite the 
steady rise in labour productivity. Finally, these policies were capped by fiscal 
measures that lowered the non-wage labour costs borne by firms as well as the 
13  For a description and analysis of German economic policy see e.g. Bibow (2013).
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taxation of company revenues. In exchange, the indirect tax burden on domestic 
consumption (and imports) has been raised. 
One direct consequence of these policies has been the external hyper-compet-
itiveness of the German economy. However, the country is paying quite a high 
price for all this. Depressed wages result in depressed domestic consumption also 
of services, which do not need to compete externally. All this helps to compound 
the overall stagnation/deflation character of growth. The average GDP growth in 
Germany (over the period 1999–2008) falls short of an unimpressive 1.38 % – 
against 1.82 % for the whole euro area. Germany’s partners (taken together) grew 
much more rapidly, although they too were not very impressive either. However, 
the differences in the sources of growth are striking. Foreign trade generated 
most of the growth in Germany (0.9 percentage points out of the overall 1.38%). 
In the entire euro area (including Germany), the contribution of foreign trade to 
growth was symbolic (0.2 p.p.). Growth in Germany’s partners in the euro area 
was reduced by foreign trade developments. The German “beggar thy neigh-
bour” policy does indeed work; however, it has turned out to be also a “beggar 
thyself” policy. 
The German wage developments have a number of consequences, of which 
the emergence of huge external imbalances across the euro area is but the first. 
Germany’s GDP gains in fact represent its partners’ GDP losses. While actu-
ally representing a loss, the trade deficit allows current domestic consumption-
cum-gross capital formation to exceed domestic production. However, when a 
country’s actual absorption is in excess of its own production (e.g. Greece), this 
implies incurring foreign debt of whatever kind (or sale of domestic real assets to 
foreign parties, for example, via privatisation). Sustained and rising external defi-
cits are tantamount to accumulating net external debt. Mirroring the situation of a 
deficit country, a chronic surplus country (such as Germany) produces more than 
it can actually use (its domestic absorption is lower than domestic production). In 
effect, the surplus country accumulates claims against its partners; in essence, it 
is lending to them – one way or another.
A “normal” chronic deficit country (unlike the United States which, for spe-
cific reasons, is quite exceptional) cannot accumulate foreign debt indefinitely. 
Sooner or later, it becomes obvious that such a country will be unable to service 
its foreign debt, whereupon it will normally be refused any additional credit. Af-
ter a decade of sustained and rising external deficits, several euro area countries 
(that have failed to emulate German wage and fiscal policies) are now becoming 
bad credit risks. Those countries will now have to pay dearly for the years of do-
mestic consumption-cum-investment in excess of their domestic production. 
The debt crisis of countries outcompeted by Germany backfires on Germany 
itself. Ultimately, a large portion of that debt is owed to Germany. Attempts 
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to service that debt would require that the countries that have lost competi-
tiveness and have followed an import-fed growth path suddenly become ma-
jor net exporters. Obviously, those countries may be able to suppress domestic 
consumption and investment. But would this automatically make their tradable 
goods (assuming they exist) and services attractive – in price/cost terms – to 
potential foreign buyers? Where are such importers to be found? Surely not in 
Germany, whose formidable competitive advantages will not disappear anytime 
soon. Ultimately, Germany may have to swallow some losses on these debts. 
More precisely, the German government will be forced to recapitalise German 
banks and other financial market institutions owning large portions of bad for-
eign debt. Parts of Germany’s past current account surpluses (and high profits 
earned by German private-sector exporters) will end up as increments to the 
German public debt. 
8. EURO AREA ACCESSION OF THE CEECS: HOPES TOO HIGH, 
RISKS UNDERESTIMATED
When joining the EU, the CEECs pledged to enter the euro area: of course, af-
ter dutifully fulfilling the Maastricht criteria. (Unlike the UK, CEECs were not 
granted derogation. But they do not seem to have sought derogation.) The three 
Baltic countries, Slovenia, and Slovakia have already become members of the 
euro area. The benefits of adopting a joint European currency are quite obvious 
(though often exaggerated) and do not require any extended exegesis. Countries 
that give up their own fixed-exchange rate regimes gain unequivocally because, 
shielded by the power of the European Central Bank, they are no longer potential 
targets of eventual speculative attacks on their national currencies. The advantages 
gained by switching over to the euro are less obvious in the case of countries that 
have had floating exchange rates. Clearly, the floating exchange-rate countries no 
longer have to respond to market-driven exchange rate fluctuations. Moreover, 
they do not lose a measure of control over their national monetary policy and 
inflation: they can continue to have some influence on the domestic interest rates. 
Although national monetary policy (for instance of the inflation-targeting kind) 
may be unable to prevent directly high capital inflows and the associated strong 
nominal appreciation that could imply increases in unit labour costs and losses in 
external competitiveness, it may also discourage such developments by trying to 
suppress domestic interest rates (and inflation). They could try making undesired 
financial capital inflows potentially less profitable. Of course – as is well known 
– floating exchange rates tend to behave unpredictably (at least in the short and 
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medium terms); this fact can restrict financial (or speculative) inflows seeking 
large rapid returns with a minimum of risk. 
So much for the theory. In practice, the experience of the CEECs which have 
retained flexible exchange rates (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Ro-
mania) has shown that periods of intensified capital inflows (and the resulting 
currency appreciation) are invariably followed by periods of intensified capital 
outflows (and some corrective currency depreciation). The periods of rising and 
falling unit labour costs (in euro terms) alternate. While the exchange rate volatil-
ity imposes certain costs and does not rule out the possibility of appreciation last-
ing too long or being occasionally too strong, this is definitely a better situation 
than that all too often observed in countries which have adopted fixed exchange 
rates (including those in the euro area).14 The year 2009 has shown that flexible 
exchange rates can mitigate the impact of a crisis. In 2009, the effective real 
exchange rates fell quite significantly in the flexible-exchange rate countries. In 
the fixed-exchange rate countries, these rates either fell minimally (in the Baltic 
states) or even rose further (in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia). The (minimal) 
corrections in the Baltic states followed from inflation temporarily suppressed 
under recessions hitting these countries with a particular severity. 
In the fixed-exchange rate countries, the losses (or gains) in competitiveness 
appear to be accumulating over time, without correcting themselves. The accom-
panying external imbalances also tend to accumulate over time. The imbalances 
may undergo temporary correction on account of deep domestic recessions (as 
observed in the Baltic states and Bulgaria). Those recessions, however, are un-
likely to eliminate (through deflation in wages and prices) the huge real overvalu-
ation levels of their currencies. As soon as lending to those countries resumes, 
they are certain to start developing large external imbalances once again.
The Maastricht inflation criterion (long perceived as an irrelevant nuisance)15 
is in fact quite sensible. Fairly soon after adopting the euro, a country that can-
not meet the criterion is sure to end up badly. Such a country would most likely 
14  Even better outcomes could be expected with a policy that controlled inflation while at the 
same time steering the exchange rates to safeguard the desired degrees of external competitive-
ness. Such a policy was successfully pursued for a long time in Slovenia (and in Italy prior to 
the establishment of the Exchange Rate Mechanism). Running such a policy requires effective 
restrictions on capital flows – outlawed under the EU Treaties.
15  The inflation criterion was viewed as absurd and actually harmful as it was incompatible with 
fast real growth, which was claimed to require higher inflation. It was even claimed to justify 
real appreciation (in otherwise chronic current account deficit countries). The latter claims were 
derived from popular misinterpretations of the so-called Balassa–Samuelson effect. Around the 
year 2000, it was proposed to ignore the Maastricht criteria – and to introduce the euro unilater-
ally (without asking anybody’s permission). Alternatively, the criteria were to be eased for the 
CEECs. Fortunately, neither proposal gained acceptance.
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experience a credit boom. With interest rates falling to the levels prevailing in 
the euro area and domestic inflation still running along its earlier trajectory, the 
economy is likely to overheat, especially as the elimination of the exchange rate 
risks would attract high capital inflows. Greece was a good example of a country 
“suffering” from a sudden drop in interest rates (upon adopting the euro), with 
inflation still running high in tandem with rapid real appreciation. Of course, 
should the resultant credit boom expand export capacities and enhance labour 
productivity, things may end well. Experience, however, tells a different tale. The 
credit booms following the adoption of the euro fuel consumption and imports 
of consumer goods, as well as boost real estate dealings and speculative invest-
ments. At the same time, they fuel rapid growth in prices. In short, experience 
shows that booms of this kind tend to end with the countries pricing themselves 
out of international competition.
Fulfilment of the Maastricht inflation criterion, though necessary, is not suf-
ficient to guarantee a measure of success after adopting the euro. First of all, the 
parity at which the domestic currency is exchanged into euro may be “too strong” 
– as evidenced in Portugal whose economy has remained stagnant since 1999. 
Secondly, even an initial undervaluation of the parity (although generally desir-
able) is not a guarantee of success either. Italy’s lira/euro parity was significantly 
undervalued even in 1997.16 These undervaluation “reserves” were soon depleted 
after 1999, as inflation in Italy was consistently higher than in Germany, while 
German labour productivity rose faster than that of Italy. In effect, price levels in 
Italy have risen rapidly relative to Germany, while the relative per capita GDP has 
been declining ever since. 
For a CEEC (or any other EU country) to fare reasonably well while par-
ticipating in the euro area, it is necessary to be able to match permanently Ger-
many’s performance on inflation, wages, productivity – and thus on unit labour 
costs. It is not sufficient to perform well against Germany on any specific date 
(or even over an extended period of time). What is needed is the ability and de-
termination to emulate Germany’s wage and fiscal policies indefinitely into the 
future – no matter what those policies may entail. In any case, faring reasonably 
well under the euro system in its present form is likely to imply, at best, a rather 
weak overall growth based on the expansion of net exports and the suppression 
of domestic demand. A better alternative may be to retain a national monetary 
policy and a depreciable currency – and then try to follow an externally balanced 
growth path. 
16  After the collapse of the first version of the Exchange Rate Mechanism the lira, like most other 
European currencies, was strongly devalued against the German mark.
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9. EPILOGUE: LITTLE ROOM FOR HIGH EXPECTATIONS
The hopes invested in the integrative model of growth seem to have been disap-
pointed. After some acceleration (but from very low levels, which were addition-
ally depressed following the policy-induced deep transitional recessions), growth 
has slowed down to unimpressive levels since 2010. Under growing integration 
into the European Union, CEEC growth rates seem to converge to the low rates 
prevailing in the “old” EU. But such a convergence in the growth rates does not 
promise a catch-up in income-level terms. Worse still, CEECs do not prove resil-
ient to the crisis shaking the “old” EU (and the euro area in particular). Last, but 
not least, it cannot be overlooked that whatever progress was made in the CEECs, 
it was achieved at a high cost. In most cases, high unemployment has become 
endemic there, while high and growing internal income (and social) polarisation 
feeds political radicalism, likely to explode sooner or later.
Of course, further progress can still be made even within this model. Indig-
enous R&D sectors could develop in the CEECs, providing them with streams of 
unique technological innovations, creating the scope for large-scale high-value 
added domestic production and employment. In the same vein, in some time per-
spective the indigenous business classes could develop to take advantage of new 
lucrative opportunities generated by the indigenous R&D. However, as things 
stand now, the R&D sectors in CEECs are close to extinction, with the more crea-
tive personnel leaving for the United States or Western Europe, while production, 
banking, and trade are firmly in foreign hands – as it used to be the case over a 
couple of recent centuries. 
Transition may have come much too late. Had the transition happened in the 
1960s, or even in the 1970s, the CEECs would have been in a much better eco-
nomic position vis-à-vis the developed Western countries. More importantly, the 
“economic model” then prevailing in the West would not, if taken over by the 
CEECs, have prescribed a wholesale external and internal liberalisation – and, 
as such, would not have forced them into a race-to-the-bottom in fiscal and wage 
policies. This “old Western European model” would, most probably, be more 
conducive than the integrative one to the faster, more balanced, and more sustain-
able economic growth of the CEECs. The ultimate goal of convergence with the 
rich Western partners would, most probably, be better served under a system with 
built-in limitations to free trade and free capital movements17 – and more scope 
for traditional industrial and trade policies.
17  After only 11 years of separation, Saarland (under French administration after WWII) was re-
turned to the then German Federal Republic (GFR). But its initial re-integration took almost 
three years (1956–1959), during which the D-mark was not the legal tender in Saarland, the 
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The CEECs are in a serious impasse. But so are other EU Member States. 
Arguably, the economic policy-making in the EU (and in the Member States) 
needs to improve. There is no shortage of proposals in this respect. The official 
line (epitomised by the consecutive versions of Fiscal Packs, or Pacts) boils 
down to the insistence on stricter, and more disciplined, adherence to the origi-
nal spirit of the Maastricht Treaty. The recipe is more of the same. However, 
there are good reasons to believe that following that official (“austerity”) line 
will do nothing to ease the vitally important problems plaguing the entire EU – 
and thus also the CEECs. A more radical overhaul of the basic paradigms of EU 
economic policy-making may be needed (see, for example, Laski – Podkaminer 
2012). Whether, and under what circumstances, such an overhaul can happen is 
yet another question.
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